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1.0 INTRODUCTTON
1.1 BACKGROUND
This document is being prepared as an extension of the concepts and approaches defined in
the limited initial study "Improving Systems Monitoring and Fault Detection/Prediction on Future
Spacelab Missions" (Reference 4 Document) The depth of penetration and detail will be
expanded and upgraded as approaches and techniques are developed and defined which are
r,.ece_sa_' for implemen:ing Health Management on future Spacelab/Space Station type Payloads
Space Transportation System (STS) Enhancements, New Launch Vehicles. such as Reusable
Launch Vehicle (RLV), and other Space Systems
Health Management, a System Enaineering Process, is defined as "Those processes-
techniques-and-technologies used to define, design, analyze, build, verify., and operate a svstem
from the viewpoint of preventing, or minimizing, the effects of failure or degradation " It
supports all ground and flight elements during manufacturing, refurbishment, integration, and
operation through combined use of hardware, software, and personnel.
The "Integrated Diagnostic Concept", focused as End-to-End Information Management. and
suggested as being implemented by Diagnostic Information Processing (DIP) in the initial study, is
expanded to delineate the necessary. Plans, Requirements. Procedures. and Methodology for
implementation Highlights of the initial study will be reiterated and details provided _,,hich are
sufficient for implementing various defined DEGREES of Health Management on applicable
Aerospace Projects
Complicating the Health Management effort are many factors
Variable Design Teams (depending on size/complexity of project)
* Skills and Specialities
System Complexity
* Many different goals, requirements and agendas, not all especially concerned with Healti_
\lana_ement (or thev conceive it in a different or cursory manner, or with a differen:
priority)
Taskpersonnel(skilledEngineers)locatedin manyareas,possiblywidely separatedand
in different companies,or organizations,all respondingto ProjectManagerswho are
determinedto keepcostsdownandschedulesintact,but demandingahigh probabilityof
projectsuccess
Efforts requiredto accomplishHealthManagementarehighlightedin this Handbook.and a
Matrix is includedshowingPhased-InProcessesto existingSectionsof the "SystemEngineering
Handbook. MSFC-HDBK-1912A" if inclusion should be desired fSee Appendix [I Tills
Document.however,wil! bea Stand,Noneentity
1.2 APPROACH
Health Management is defined in this Document as a Subprocess of the System Engineering
Process In reality, Health Management consists of man,,' efforts, accomplished in each Phase of
NASA's five Phased Project Steps, (See Figure III-l) but accomplished in conjunction v_ith other
standard System Engineering efforts. (See Table I-l, Integrated System Engineering Processes
with Time-Related Health Management Processes) These processes, which are required
throughout a project's Life Cycle, will be outlined, described and sequenced throughout the Fixe
Phases Earl',, Health Management efforts are absolutely necessary, if it is to be implemented on
any project and thev must be accomplished if it is to be effective Like all System Engineering.
Health Management must be dynamic, that is, it must evolve, x_hen needed or desired, into
accomplishing the results that any Project Engineer expects for that specific Project -- ho_``e,,er, it
must never be in the critical path of a project's development.
This document vdll integrate Health Management Processes [Six 16) I-[M Phases] into the Five
151 Proiect Phases in such a manner that it is never a stand alone tasL'effort which separately
defines independent work functions. This division would create isolationism in design and
planned usage and would never be effective in operations So Systems Engineering personnel _ill
coordinate the development and integration of all Requirements for Svstem and Detail Design.
Reliability. Maintainability, Safety, Survivability, and Health Management and other such efforts
into the total Engineering effort, and will insure that all Requirements are identified and baselined
to meet the Projectobjectivesduring the ProjectLife Cycle (ReferenceTable [-2, Systems
Engineering._-easof Expertise)
TABLE I-1
INTEGRATED SYSTEM ENGINEERING PROCESSES
WITH TIME-RELATED HEALTH MANAGEMENT PROCESSES
SE--Standard System Engineering Processes
_,l--Health Management Sub-Processes
Phase A
A-SE- t Project Objectives
A-t-LM-1 Health Management Definition Statement and Generalized Intent
A-SE-2
A-I-LM-2
Research and advanced technology requirements
Process Improvement through Sensor/computer technology/sot'cware
technology investigations -- Search for State-of-the-Art or newly
developed tool-box advancements in Health Management technology--
Emphasize search for any deficient aspect
A-SE-3
A-I-LM-3
] rade-off analysis
Explore depths of potential Health Management implementation using
Level I requirements (See Table IV-4, Health Management Implementation
Level Decision)
Selection of system concepts
Inputs (options) to be included in risL/cost analysis (See Figure IV-3, Cost
Effectiveness Example) and defined in Preliminary. System Requirements
and reflected in preliminary studies
Phase B
B-SE-I
B-HM-I
Development of System Requirements Document (SRD) and Science and
Engineering (S&E) Implementation Plan
Define Health Management goals and develop Requirements tbr inclusion
in SRD
B-SE-2
B-[-LM-2
Refinement of selected alternative concepts and trade-off analysis
Options derived/selected from Phase A to be explored with cost versus
gain' emphasized-Cost Effectiveness update
B-SE-3
B-tLM-3
B-I-LM-4
Pertbrmtrade-offanalysis
Refinedepth/costradesof levelsappropriateto projectcomplexityand
Level I requirements
PerformPreliminaryFaultToleranceAmalysis
B-SE-4
B-FL\I-5
Refinement of system and support requirements
Develop Preliminary Versions ot_
(a) Inter-System Information Relationship Listing (ISIRL)
(b) Health Management-Measurement Program (I_I-MP), and
(c) Functional Failure-Definition and Resulting Effects Listing (FF-
D._REL).
B-I-LM-6 Drive out Health Management Requirements for Specific Projects utilizing
the [LM Requirements Generation Process described in Methodo[oD'
Section V5 of this Handbook
B-I-Pvl-7 Develop Test Be&Simulation Functional Fault Requirements
B-I-LM-8 Baseline Health Management Requirements at System Requirement
Review (SRR)
B-SE-5
B-I-LM-9
Definition of Preliminary Test Requirements
Identify Preliminary verification methods/requirements for verifying and
utilizing ISIRL in test operations
B-SE-6
B-I-L\I- 10
Preliminary Design Review (PDR) baseline
Participate in Preliminary Design Review (PDR) with focus on
implementation ofbaselined Requirements and ISIRL development
Phase C
C-SE-1
C - FL\I- I
Performance of detailed system analysis
Detailed analysis of Inter-System Information Relationship Listing t lSIRL _
-- and Functional Failure-Definition and Resulting Effects Listing (FF-
DAREL)
C-I-LM-2 Perform detailed "Time To Criticality" Analysis of all identified Functional
Failures
C-H.\I-3 Pertbrm Test Bed/Simulation Functional Faults
C-SE-2
C-HM-4
Completion of detail design
Establish methods of expressing the Inter-System Information
Relationships (Both in software algorithms/statements and bv manual
procedure statements)
C-SE-3
C-HM-5
C-SE-4
C-FL\I-6
Developfnal Manufacturing-Test-Verification-Integration-Operations
supportingsystems,facilityplans,andVRSD
Developcriteriaandfinalizethedegree/depthof Health Management
beingimplemented--Insureits functionsareincludedin all Plans,IP&CL,
'_SD andotherapplicable documents.UpdateCostEffectiveness
.&nalvsis
PerformCriticalDesignReview(CDR)
FinalizeISIRL,FF-DARELandinsureall HealthManagementStatements
(SoftwareandManual)aredocumentedin theISIRL, includingthose
functionsoperatingbehindthescene,_hoserequiringoperator
decisiort/intervention,andeitherby crewor by groundoperations.Finalize
PlansandRequirementsfor Verification/Validationof all Statementsvia
theVRSD
Phase D
D-SE-I
D- I--LM-1
Development and test of prototype/protoflight hardware
Utilization of prototype/protoflight hardware to study effectiveness of
implemented Health Management
D-SE-2
D-tBI-2
Verification/validation-qualification of Hardware and Software for flight
Establish, through test, accurate/dependable/confident HealthManagement
operations to degree being implemented
D-SE-3 Manufacture, Integrate and Checkout flight systems
D-I-LM-3 Satis_' all VRSD Requirements for implemented Health Management
Phase E
Support flight and evaluate functional operations
Support flight operations and evaluate Health Management functionality--
determine effectiveness in terms of fault detection-prevention-recover?'
This concept of Health Management (HM) must be accomplished through Paneb%"orking
Groups focused on establishing Inter-System Relationships of Measurements and Information as
discussed in the Description Section. The familiar facets of HZM that address Availability.
Reliability. and Maintainability (such as Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) physical replacement and
spare availability) are not a significant element in this concept. The Process must be accomplished
using the skills of System Engineers, Detail Designers, Sat?ty & Mission Assurance (S&MA)
Personnel,Project Personnel,Software Designers,Test, Science and Mission Operations
Personnel
The Basic Theme is that there is an additional Level of Information which contains Multi-
System data, which is necessary to make choices and decisions--but which is not often developed-
-but can be gleaned from the skills of the Engineering personnel listed above and by the described
processes in this Handbook
-[he Proactive P ocess of Planning for, anticipating, ancl developing the use of this Level of
Information dunng all Life Cycle Phases is key to the success of Health Management as described
in this Handbook
Conceptual Layout
Orbital and Flight Mechanics
Gmdance and Navlganon*
Electromagnetic Compatibilits. /Interference*
Resource Utilization Reporting
(Mass Propemes. Elecmcal Power,
Instrumentation and Commands)
System Venficat,on
Planning and Requmzments
Compliance
Spacecraft Charging
Natural Environments (Space and
and Terrestrial)
End-to-End Funcnonal Schemancs
System Design
[nterface Definmon and Control
Lightning Protection
Ground lntegranon and Operations
GSE Requirements
Systems Reqmrements
Health Management* System TesffVerificatmn
* = Added Area of Prime Expertise
TABLE I-2. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AREAS OF EXPERTISE
6
1.3 GOALS
The Goals for Health Management implementation are as follows:
* .Allow the Project Manager to select an appropriate degree of Health Management
suitable for that Project.
* Health Management must "ADD VALUE" to a Project without increasing Life Cycle
cost
* No new Documentation Requirements (DR's) nor Reports are required
* No new Technology. is required to implement the various Degrees of
Managemer: concept
this Health
* All Processes are to be fully described in Layman's Terms for better understanding and
optimum implementation
This Health Management effort is to be invisible to those who seek to find identifiable.
dedicated manpower Level-of-Effort--It will be meshed in with other System Engineering
effort and Design Tasks--but--it does have Identifiable Goals, Requirements, and Specific
Methodologies
This Document will be a stand-alone treatise on Health Management from a System
Engineering viewpoint, providing definition of phased in Proactive Processes to be
accomplished during Phased Project Development It will be suitable for inclusion as an
Applicable Document in a contracted project environment.
lI.0 PURPOSE
As earlier stated, Health Management must be accomplished through orgamzed cffort It x_lll not
happen ff not focused, coordinated, and directed bv strong System Engmeenng thrust A mandate from thc
Project Manager must be given to support and develop the affordable and selected degree of Health
Management to be implemented and it must not be fulfilled as a jerkxvater tasL_proccss
The concept and methodotogj described m this Handbook requires the usc of skills and knox_ledec and
key inputs of Subsystem. System. and Scientific Instrument detail designers and developers S_stcm
Engineers. ,_ogethe; wlr.h _hese hard_sare designers, software designers. Project Engmeecs. Test. Safct\ and
Mission Assurance. and Operanons Personnel _ill accomplish the layout and implementation of sensors.
fault controls (hardware and so,rare), and effectors to detect, prevent, isolate, and recover from all
potential faults that can be discerned by extensive analysis, investigation, or additionally determined bx
standard modeling practices, and by artificial neural net_xork (.ANN) prediction Decisions can bc made on
dealing _ath. or treating, these discerned faults either in-flight, on the ground, and c_ther bx human
decision/determination, or computer control and sotS'are logic--or by a combination of all these opnons
T}pical Trade Studies. identified tn this Handbook (See Section IV. DESCRIPTION. Imtta[ Rcqmrcmcnts
Phase, Conceptual Desig'n Phase. and Prehrmnarv Design Phase). or which may be identlficd as needed
dunng acnve Project development. _ill help select specific methods, to detect, and deal with specific faults.
_mpending faults, controls and recovenes These efforts comprise the Health Management Process
(Concept) described in this Handbook and are shown in the "Health Management Floxv". Figure IV I
This Handbook provides the methods and idenufies the design provisions to aid m both pre_cntmg the
occurrence of faults and rmtigating the effect of faults that do occur This _s accomplished bx dexelopm'='
the additional level of multi-system Information (more than just measurements reflecting data. status, a_zd
sclentlfiC mforrnatton) _vhich is needed for making choices and declsions which have a sigmficant impact _r:
fadure ancL'or successes of aerospace endeavors Therefore. the overriding purpose of this Handbook _s z,,
describe the efforts/processes, and who performs these efforts, which arc needed to be accomplished m ail
Life Cycle Phases tn order to have effectwe Health Management.
!II.0 SCOPE
Health Management, as it is applicable to Spacelab/Space Station Payloads, STS
Enhancements, Reusable Launch Vehicles (RLV), or other Space Systems, i.e, Scientific
Experiments, is more than "Health Monitoring"--First, it is an organized method, coordinated and
directed by a strong System Engineer and secondly, it makes maximum and cooperative use of
skills of Sub-System and Scientific Instrument Detail Designers. Although it is emphasized that
no new technology is required, these processes make maximum use of existing skills and
enhancin_,, technology It is recognized that new/advanced technology occurs e,,'e_ _ ,,'ear
Enhancing Technology, more visible through Investigative and Trade Studies, as appropriate, is
encouraged, especially in areas of sensors, smart devices, computer/control technology, and
software advances and updated versions
This Document describes the discipline of Health Management for "Systems" as used on
vehicles, payloads and/or experiments. It consists of processes, techniques, and technologies used
to design, analyze, build, verify, and operate that system from a viewpoint of preventing, or
minimizing, the effects of failures. All Functional Faults, or failures, will be addressed and these
are not addressed as Safety issues, but only as they may degrade planned operational behavior
This process will explicitly be based on "Information" generation, correlation, processing and
feedback as defined in our Initial Study (Ref 4) but now is expanded with strategy' and
considerations (steps/plans/studies) outlined for use in understanding and making use of three
incremental degrees, or levels, which could be implemented. All efforts will be identified to the
Life Cycle Phasing, although some shifting between phases, or sequencing, will probably be
needed, or desired, on some projects Accomplishing the efforts/processes in different
development Phases than those recommended/identified in this Handbook can result in effective
Health Managemer:, but may not be as "Cost Effective" (See Section IV1 1 1, Cost
Effectiveness and Reliability/Risk ._malysis)
The description of Efforts/Processes required in this Health Management approach and the
Degrees of Implementation are discussed in Section IV O (Description) and are presented at a
working level and in layman's terms since it is felt that the most effective paths are those which
canbe readily understood and involve less complexity This approach and description are also
most important since Health Management, in all cases, can not be separated from Safety Issues
and Paths because many functional faults trace, or propagate, into safety related paths We do
not, however, intend to address safety issues, plans_ nor processes/procedures in this
Handbook
Functional Failure-Definitions and Resulting Effects Listing (FF-DAREL)
Worksheets will be developed and used by the System Engineer as a key element in this
process The FF-D?d{EL is an expanded FMEA which is developed over a different time frame
and is only a Working Document which provides a means of identi_ing and managing all
potential failures/faults These Worksheets are discussed in more detail in Section V,
(METHODOLOGY), and may be of benefit in FMEA/CIL development which normally occurs
later in the Development Phases than these Worksheets
Health Management is just one of many System Engineering Jobs--but it is not lust a System
Engineering Job, but requires effort/emphasis by ALL DISCIPLINES.
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IV.O DESCRIPTION
IV. 1 NARRATIVE (OVERVIEW)
This section of the Handbook presents an Overview of the Processes which can be used in
implementing the "Integrated Diagnostic Concept" of Health Management There are Processes,
and efforts, which must be done in each Project Development Phase Roles of Key Personnel
will be identified along with the Processes and will further be developed in Section V--
"Methodology" There are three (3) Key Working Documents which are identified and their
purpose Is described in this Section, and their development and use is described in the
"Methodology" Section. The Health Management Development Process begins with the "Initial
Requirements Phase" and proceeds through "Conceptual Design Phase", "Preliminary Design
Phase", "Detail Design Phase", "Fabrication and Test Phase", and concludes with the "Operations
Phase" Figure IV 1, HE.M..TH MANAGEMENT FLOW, shows the sequential steps and broad
Health Management efforts outlined in this Handbook.
IV. 1.1 THE INITLa_L REQUIREMENTS PHASE
This Phase encompasses the Project Development Phase A and consists of very. fluid and
broad efforts and is expressed in Top Level Terms.
* The System Engineer who has responsibility for Health Management during this Phase
assesses the Project Concept, and familiarizes with broad block diagrams and/or mission
development timelines
* The System Engineer searches the available (sometimes being developed) documentation
such as "Program Requirements Document", "System Specifications", or "Safety and Mission
Assurance Requirements", and "Project Plan" for Health Management relevant irfformation such
as Projects Objectives. Technolow and Advanced Development Requirements. Targets for
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Probability for Mission Success (PMS), Potential Health Management Trades, and Reliability
Targets for Sub-Systems. These high level documents often provide insight into the Project plans
for maintenance missions, replaceable elements, availability, and any planned reflight, recycling, or
refurbishment of the spacecraR This information enables the System Engineer to evaluate the
need for specific I-_I Requirements to be imposed on the detail design (hardware and software)
(See Section IV. 12 1, Requirements, General & Typical Candidates).
* The System Engineer addresses the need for :rracie Studies which would suggest options-
with relevant Health Management functions for Sub-System Desig_n_-These could be initiated by
the System Engineer, or more appropriately initiated and controlled by the detail designer, with
participation by the System Engineer. Typical Health Management relevant functions which could
be addressed during Trade Studies as a prime, or secondary objective are:
--Vehicle (On-Board) Health Management versus Ground Health Management Design
Options
--Design alternatives in areas related Health Management,
such as:
+Reliability
-Fault Tolerant, versus
-Fault Avoidance = (Considerations such as cost-complexity-and impact of partial.
or complete mission failure)
-Maintainability
-Diagnosibility
-Repairability
-Accessibility
-Supportability
Considerations and impacts of each
(parameters-spares-storage space/weight
expertise availability)
-Information
-That necessary for analysis (typical for similar projects)
-That necessary for trending (typical for similar projects)
--Deterrmnation of how much one quality characteristic (such as reliability) can be
compromised at the expense of another quality characteristic (such as pointing accuracy) in
various controllable aspects of the design. A method to determine the potential desirability of
14
such a trade study is the Matrix shown in Figure IV2, Design Characteristics Correlation Matrix
A characteristic which has strong interaction with numerous other characteristics possibly should
be studied to determine the degree of acceptable change to optimize the design. (Ref Doc 1
RECMS-Martin Marietta, October 30, 1992)
Quality Characteristic
1. Validation/Cert of
Quality Characteristics
2. External Environmental
Tolerance Factors
3 Veh Tol to Induced
Environment
4. System Margin Safety
5 System Status Det
W - WEAK
M - MODERATE
S - STRONG
1 2 3 4 _ 5
CORRELA"
IMAGE OF
M
"ION IS MIRR(
FILLED INSID
-_M
M
)R
g
I
S- M
S
M
S
FIGURE IV2, DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS CORRELATION MATRLX
* There are Project Manager Guidelines which must be considered at this early Phase of
Health Management activity. The goal of Health Management might be given in terms of
"intent"- onlv recognizing that activity toward accomplishing some degree will be appropriate for
that project. Typical constraints which could give insight into the degree of Health Management
to be implemented are: Schedule, Resources (Funding-Manpower), Mean Time Between Failure
(MTBF), or Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) guidelines. Surge guidelines (capability to respond
(a) urgently, or (b) routinely) are other examples of typical Project Managers guidelines.
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* R.is'k/Cost Assessments are typically performed as part of the "Initial Requirements Phase"
and are updated as appropriate in the "Conceptual Design Phase."
* The tangible product (or output) of this "Initial Requirements Phase" is the Preliminary
Requirements. This consists primarily of a generalized definition of the Health Management
concept for the Project and is the first stage in a more detailed Requirement Definition in the next
Health Management Phase.
_. "I
IV.I.I.I COST EFFECTIVENESS AND RELIABILITY/RISK ANALYSIS
Cost Effectiveness analysis as discussed in this Section of the Handbook is accomplished in
the Initial Requirements Phase and is likely updated in both the Conceptual Design Phase and the
Preliminary Design Phase.
As stated in the Initial Study (Ref Doc 4) and substantiated in many Reference Documents
(Ref. Doc. 1 RECMS), Ref Doc. 21, Boeing Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Mission and System
Effectiveness, and Ref. Doc. ll, Engineering Design for Producibility and Reliability, John \V
Priest, 1988, Marcel Dekker, Inc., there are always costs up front that represent additional
program expenditures, however, the savings realized during test/checkout and operations over the
Life Cycle more than offset these initial costs. In this case of "Integrated Diagnostic Concept"
outlined in this Handbook much of the very much time consuming analysis and decision making
that is required during integration, verification testing and operations is accomplished in the early
design phases These choices and decisions are developed into statements and algorithms and
translated into software logic and/or procedures for use in the later test/operational phases Thus.
the critical time which might be needed to make these choices and decisions and the possibility of
inconsistent decisions in test/operational phases is minimized. A reliable method for arriving at
credible cost analysis, or savings, remains a challenge and is always subject to debate relative to
accuracy Tangible cost saving benefits can be more accurately determined for projects that are
re-flown and with repetitive operations - where the savings are compounded - however, for
projects that need assessments/benefit analysis in early project development phases, or, tbr one
flight mission, a more methodical process must be used and, even then, many assumptions and
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later updates are required An example of the problem relates to the question of redundancy of a
critical pressure sensor in a fuel cell - Is the increase in probability of success by providing a
redundant sensor enough to justify, the extra costs - and are other risks related to having total
backup fuel cell capability worth more than incremental redundancy n Schedule constraints and
inability to have credible reliability and cost data often take precedence over decisions based on
cost alone So, x_ith these uncertainties in mind, the following simplified method (and
guideline, tool) tbr arriving at cost analysis is described
Cost Effectiveness
Cost Effectiveness tCE )
Where
,amd
And:
Describes the relative value of a system. It's measure reflects the cost
of purchase/manufacture, installation, maintenance of the system over
it's useful life and the operational cost while performing it's intended
function. It can apply to a subsystem, system, vehicle, payload or an
experiment.
So, it can be expressed as:
System Effectiveness (S E)
Acquisition Cost _- Utilization Cost
System Effectiveness is a measure of the probability that the system can
successfully meet an operational demand within a given time when
operated under specified conditions.
Acquisition costs are those funds expended to attain a specified
performance. This includes development cost, production cost, and the
cost to ready the system for it's mission after it is produced
Utilization Cost is the predicted, or actual, cost of a mission which used
the system with no anomalies.
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An Example of the above expression tbllows
SYSTEM
P.MX Pointing
System
PAX
Pointing
System with
Health
Management
COST
100,000
FAILURE
RATE PER
100
FAILURE
RATE IMP. S.E.
96
C.E.
9 60x10 _
°_
100,960 3 25 97 9 60x10 a
--'OI,920 2 50 98 9 O0xI0 _
98101,000 5O 9 70x l I)_
FIGURE IV 3 COST EFFECTIVENESS EXAMPLE
Note: In this example, any Failure Rate Improvement causing a System Effectiveness iS E_
increase of more than $960/point is cost ineffective The last example of $500/point is shown as a
positive cost effective I-EM effort.
,Another method of expressing Cost Effectiveness (C E.) is:
Cost Effectiveness (C E) = Cost of Improvement (ie, Health Management)
Failure Rate Improvement
Here, Cost Effectiveness is the cost per unit of Failure Rate Improvement -- (Less Cost, Unit
of Improvement is more cost effective)
In the above exa.nple, the C.E. of Health Management added to the PAX Pointing System is
38 4 in Examples No 1 & 2 and is 20 in Example No 3
The latter expression is less complicated and seems to reflect a more meaningful expression of
Health Management effectiveness.
In the above example, it is just a matter of searchinggleaning information on costs to
determine Life Cvcle Costs, and/or costs of enhancement.
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DeterminingtheSvstemEffectiveness(expressed as Failure Rate) is more complicated and is
a function of Reliability, Maintainability, Human Factors, Logistics, and other variables (See
References for Life Cycle Costs/Risk Management in the Subject Matrix, Appendix II)
IV.I.2 CONCEPTUAL DESIGN PHASE
(These efforts are accomplished in the early part of Project Development Phase B) Systems
Engineers and Detail Designers must begin to form a Conceptual Definition of the Health
Management design during this Phase. To do this, the early definition of the Vehicle Systems.
Ground Systems and, very. importantly, the Information System concept (sensors/measurements.
signal conditioning, data gathering, data handling/processing/managing and storing and
commands) must be studied at the available System, Sub-System, Assembly, and Component
Levels The point of this study is to be aware of what is being planned, and to influence this
concept with specifi c Health Management Design Requirements. It is recognized that. at this
stage of Project Development, there may be very little known about the Sub-System, Assembly.
and Component Levels, but, to the extent that discussions are being held and broad block
diagrams are being developed with functional requirements being assigned to Boxes, the function
of Health Management must be included in the appropriate blocks.
* Additional Trade Studies are also appropriate at this Phase Candidates for Trades tot
Investigations) are
(1) Identification of Fault Containment Regions (Definition: A Region in the System.
beyond _,hich certain faults are not permitted to propagate). The purpose of defining
Containment Regions is to prevent, by deliberate design (hardware or so,ware), the failure of one
functional element from causing failure in other functional areas If the failure can be contained
with 1000o certainty -- then the other Functional element would not have to show that particular
failure as a Failure Mode This effort can be significantly cost effective if it is identified and
v_orked in the Conceptual Design Phase
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_2}Passive Fault Tolerance Analvsis,Trades are studies of design provisions, and
determining those specific designs that can accommodate failure by preventing, delaying, or
rerouting the path to a less critical, or already accommodated, path Examples are "Material Use
Selection" and "Physical Containment or Separation" to prevent electromagnetic or heat coupling
bet_ een devices
** Test Beds and Simulators can be used to further define Functional Faults. Fault
Tolerances. and Off-Nominal Functional Faults It is highly unlikely that Health Management
requirements alone could drive the positive need for Test Beds or Simulators However. if the
needs of other disciplines supports their availability and use, then Health Management
requirements should lend their support, IDENTIFY REQUIREMENTS FOR, and Plan for their
use in the above identified areas in the "Preliminary. Design Phase"
of whether sufficient sensors/measurements are strategically
Functional Faults) can be simulated and analyzed for effectiveness.
be the pre-cursor to the "Standard Modeling" (ADItLMA) and ",Artificial Neural Network t._NLN')
Modeling" t.M),_M) efforts occurring in the Health Management "Detail Design Phase"
Fault diagnosibility (in terms
located to detect identified
This Test Bed/Simulation can
* Fault/Failure Prediction (Trending)--Efforts to identify, Functional Faults which can be
predicted by Intbrmation (parameters, both active and archived) must begin to be identified in this
Health Management Conceptual Design Phase This Information will later be listed in the ISIRL
as Statements/.Mgorithms with all Functional Faults and the methodolow which is devised to
detect. PREDICT. isolate, or recover from these functional Failures.
* Perform Active Fault Tolerant Amalvsis on each Functional System Investigation of
the Need tbr Redundant Functions or Redundant Paths is needed to accomplish an acceptable
de_ree of tolerance to an identified failure The Justification and Criteria for this Need involves
v
many factors and guides should be gleaned from the "System Requirements Document" tSRD).
_hich would be a joint responsibility of the Project Manager, System Reliability, and Health
.Management A major input toward justi_ing this need is the Probability of Mission Success
IPMS) goal for the Prqject along with the Criticality of the identified failure.
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** Prelimina_' Software Reco`.e_' (Sequences) and Data Base Sizin,- &
Timing:Capability--From the results of the Trade Studies. Active Fault Tolerance Anal,,sis. and
Trending M_alysis. the Detail Designers and Software analysts can begin to scope the necessar,.
detection and recoverv software sequencies This allows some initial data base sizing and
softv_are effort scoping to take place although the major scoping and sizing efforts ,,_,ill take place
in the next Health Nlanagement Phase (Prelimina_' Design Phase)
Note Those Health Management related/supporting tasks, which are noted bv "_*" can
be, and maybe should be, initiated and directed bv the System Engineer--but the`. invol,,e much
more than just Health Management factors and absolutely require Detail Designer participation
Those tasks noted bv "2.2._'' indicate that the prime responsibility should be with the Detail
Designer
The PRIME OUTPUT of this Health Management Phase is the generation of a set of
Health Management Requirements which are to be Reviewed and Baselined in the "Svstem
Requirements Review" (SRR) It should be remembered that this Time Frame is very earl,, in the
Project Definition (Preliminao' Design) Phase and final details implementing the Requirements are
the subject of later documents and review
IV.I.2.1 REQUIREMENTS (GENERAL AND TYPICAL-CANDIDATES)
GENERAL : [nitial Requirements (Prelimina_') are identified in the Health Management
(t-LM) Initial Requirements Phase
Final Requirements are identified in the Conceptual Design Phase and are
Baselined after Review in the System Requirements Review ISRR)
Requirements must be written to a level of understanding that Sub-S,;stem
Designers can begin to assess alternatives for Sub-System design
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Requirementsbeginv_ithTop LevelSystemsRequirementsv_'hich may, or
may not, have reference to Health Management
System Engineer would develop next lower tier of Requirements
Requirements are Related to "Functional Failure" Detection, Prevention.
Isolation, and Recoverw and must state performance characteristics that can
be verified to meet some criteria--OR--they must Require the acquiring of
s,__me additional data or product that is specified
See Section V 5 (Methodology) I-LM Requirement Generation Process For
Developing Specific I-LM Requirements
TYPICAL/(CANDIDATES}:
Functional Requirements:
-- Sensors to detect all conditions of Functional Failures must be provided
-- Sensors and Data Acquisition providing analysis (on-board or on ground-
TBD during the tLM Process) must be available and active during all
integration, test, and operational phases
--Environments must be monitored to insure identity of transient and
environmentally susceptible functional failures.
-- Sufficient sensor and derived data must be available during all integration.
test. and operational phases to support anomaly detection, prevention.
isolation, and recovery-- Including trending and prediction of anomalies
-- The health of the software utilized in FLM must be selfdeterrnined and
provided through normal data acquisition--Corrective software routines _vill
be inhibited upon HM software error determination.
-- Actual Functional Failures must be distinguished from sensor/data
acquisition failures.
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-- Critical failures_,itl involvetheuseof multiplelimits-withassociated
multiplelevelsof criticality
-- HM samplingrates (analog) _,ill be at least 2 times the rate at which the
t'ailure could occur Digital signals must be at the same rate at which the
failure could occur Rates must be adjustable (as needed) to allow for
increases in suspicious conditions
--Utilize Smart Sensors with BIT capability(Signal Conditioning and other
Data Acquisition Hardware should utilize BITE _,.hen criticaliw dictates or
when cost effective
--The capability to handle failures (detect-prevent-isolate-recover) must be
time or parameter variable if the failure characteristics vary according to
mission phase
-- Time to Criticality of all Functional Failures must be addressed and
accommodated in Detection/PreventionyRecovery' routines
-- HM hardware and associated software must be accurate and respond to
accommodate 97% of all critical failures
-- False accommodation (due to all I-LM functions) must be less than I°o
SPECIFIC -- REQUIRED BY THIS HANDBOOK
Develop HM-MP (A Health Management Process) per guidelines specified
in this Handbook.
Purpose: To document that all "Effects" from Functional Failures can be
adequately shown by identified primary' measurements or by backup
(redundant) supporting measurements
: To identify, and record related measurements
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To provide a basis for developing the ISIRL (in conjunction
with the FF-DAREL)
Develop FF-DAREL (A Health Management Process), an "Early FMEA"
_vhich supports other Health Management Processes Its purpose is to
identil%' all Functional Failures. define and record the resulting Effects and
insure that measurements are planned which reveal these Failure Effects
Develop ISIRL (A Health Management Process) per guidelines specified
in this Handbook
Purpose To document M_.L Statements and Algorithms associated _,_ith
Functional Fault Detection, Prediction, Isolation, and Recover'--AND--the
Method of Implementation (Software Logic or by Manual Procedure
IV.I.3 THE PRELIMINARY DESIGN PHASE
(Late Project Phase B and Early Project Phase C) The conceptual implementanon of
Health Management into the Project design begins to take form during this Phase which
encompasses Project (Late) Preliminary. and (Early) Final Design leading to the Critical Design
Review and Baselining of the Program Documentation. The effort accomplished during this
Phase is critical to implementing an effective Health Management Program.
Results of technical efforts accomplished in the Conceptual Design Phase [Identification of
Fault Containment Kegions, Fault/Failure Prediction (Trending), Active Fault Tolerance analysis.
and Requirements identified and Baselined] are further developed and updated, or validated, along
x_ith "Cost Effectiveness" information. This data feeds into, and provides major input for. the
"Health Management Level Decision" Process.
The Requirements identified for using Test Beds/Simulators, and centered around
Functional Fault Definitions. Fault Tolerances, and Off-Nominal Functional Faults are
implemented to further solidify these potential Failure Identifications. Tolerances, and their
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resultim.zeffects Theresultsof thisTestBed.Simulationeffort are to be reflectedin the "Health
ManauementLevelDecision"Process
It is notedthat in Ref No l, RECMS. that hardx,,arefaults aredue lessto "Random
Failures"thanto "HumanFaultin manufacturing,environmental faults, or design faults" [f this
statement is. m fact. true, then strong emphasis placed on test and verification can detect and
eliminate many potential failures before the Operations Phase The concept described in this
Handbook of Health Management is not designed to predict and manage failure due {o
manufacturing, fauttv environmental/other design capabilities It should be noted that atl other
identifiable potential Failures. regardless of cause or source, must be addressed in the
development of the FF-DAREL, and the method of accommodating the failure is documented in
the ISIRL
Additional TRADE STUDIES are appropriate during this Phase
Examples are
1) M1 efforts should be made to utilize sensors that are required to provide parameter
data in support of operational needs as opposed to dedicated Health Management use Health
Management use of critical control parameters [and the associated sensor(s)] may complicate
Health Management Mgorithms or Statements to an unmanageable degree Trades to inxestigate
this possibility and to identify alternatives, such as dedicated, or decentralized sensors and unique
software, decoupled from operations, for Health Management use are appropriate
2) Trade Studies during this Phase to evaluate the need for Redundant Paths and Boxes
may be necessarv Considerations for Multiple use Hardware and Software (Mission_Operations
and Health Management Use) or Dedicated Hardware and Software for Health Management use
onl,,l should be evaluated in certain cases. Critical Functional Failures, earlier identified in Trade
Studies may suggest the need for Redundancy of equipment and Paths--Review of this earlier
analysis with updated justification, substantiation, and criteria is desirable during this Phase
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Constraints iCost. Schedule. \ITBF. MTTR) that were addressed in the "Initial
Requirements Phase" should now be reassessed with the additional maturity of the Project and
will be a factor in the "Health .Management Level Decision" Process.
Several ma or Health Management efforts begin in this Phase. Development of the "FF-
DAREL" (A Health Xlanagement Process) described in Section V 3 of this Handbook is a major
_,,orking Document and the Preliminary version is one of the primal' outputs All
potential, predicted Functional Failures are listed in this Document, along with other necessar_
intbrmation discussed in Section V3 The "I--L-M-M_P" development, began during the
"Conceptual Design Phase" is a major development task during this Phase It includes a total
planned Parameter/Measurement listing which will be used to insure that all "Functional Failure
Effects" can and will be detected This Document also supports the sizing and scoping of the
Data Base capabilir' .-Mthough it is not finalized until the "Detail Design Phase", it's major
development, and use, occurs in the "Preliminary. Design Phase" The Process detailing it's
development is also outlined in Section V 2 (Methodology) of this Handbook The Key Working
Document developed for Health Management is the "ISIRL", also a Health Management Process
A prelimina_' version of this Working Document encompasses the Algorithm_Statement
approaches and also documents the Fault Isolation and Response Statements. The Circuitr),.Paths
and Hardware/Soft,,vare which is being identified to accommodate all identified Functional
Failures. both bv Software Logic and by Manual Procedures is included in the Document
The major decision regarding the Selected Health Management Level of Implementation is
determined during this Phase (See Figure IV-4, Health Management Implementation Level
Decision) Results from Fault Analysis, Trades, and Test Bed/Simulations. along with Cost
EITectiveness data provides sufficient input to determine the most appropriate Le,,el tbr the
specific Project -_his Decision Process involves Selecting either (1) Aural Definition of
Intersvstem Relationships (ADIR), (2) Aural Definition of Intersystem Relationships _ith
.Modeling Assistance (ADIR.MA), or (3) Aural Definition with ._MNN (Artificial Neural Networkt
Modeling (ADA_\I) This Process is described in Section V I along with the Methodology tbr the
other four major Processes
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OPTION 1
OPTION "
DECISION D-l) = HM LEVEL 1 (ADIR)
DECISION D-1) = HM LEVEL 1 (ADIR) .,-_N_D[LEVEL 2
(ADII_MA) OR LEVEL 3 (AD.,-_M)]
OPTION 3 DECISION D-2) = HM LEVEL 1 (.,M)IR) ,_ND LEVEL 2
(ADIRMA) ._ND LEVEL 3 (A.DAM)
Figure IV-4, Health Management Implementation Level Decision
ThePrimaryoutputsfrom thisPhaseof HealthManagementDevelopmentarePrelimma_
versionsof the H.\I-NIP, FF-DAREL. and the ISIRL The Major decision, concluded from this
Phase, is one of the ,hree Levels of Implementation described above
IV.I.4 TIlE DETAIL DESIGN PHASE
(Encompasses Project Development Phase C) This is the most intense Phase in the
Health Management Process Specifically, it involves gatherin_ and assembling the mass
information from the Health Management Working Documents (FF-DMLEL, I-LM-MP. and
Preliminary [SIRL) into meaningful Statements and Mgorithms. Ml Studies, Trades and the
Preliminary Working Documents and the Preliminary_ Design has been accomplished and the
Decision has been made with respect to the Level of Health Management to implement No`'v. the
Detail Sub-System and System Design is underway in preparation for the Critical Design Reviex_,
The Algorithms/Statements and their supporting parameters/measurements, and Redundant Boxes
and Paths, and the Preliminary Design with Health Management functions such as Fault
Containment and Passive Fault Tolerance provisions has progressed to Final Design The S`"stem
Engineer with Health Management responsibility must be keenly aware of the progressing Final
Design in order to prepare the ISIRL which implements the selected Health Management Le`"el
From the progressing Detail Design and from the HM-MP, FF-DAREL, and the
Preliminar,. ISIRL. the Statements/Algorithms are developed which define the fingerprint of the
Functional Failures and define the Methods of accommodating (detecting, preventing, isolating.
and, or recovering) the failure
The method of implementing the ADIR Level of Health Management involves detailed
discussions with all the Detail Designers which have responsibility for Sub-System desi_qn and
_hich have an',' traceable relationship to any specific Failure The ADIR Statements and
Algorithms must be -teveloped prior to progressing to either the ADIRMA Level or M),_\I Level
of implementation ADIR DEVELOPMENT IS A PRE-REQUISITE TO FURTHER
LEVELS OF IMPLEMENTATION
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ADIRMA involves utilizin_ the .M)IR Statements and .M_orithms and all other
measurements;commands/relationships (not all necessarily involved in Health Management)in
Standard Modeling Prediction The output of this level results in a higher lexel of confidence that
all Information Relationships have been identified and are included in the [SIR/..
ADAM also involves utilizing ADIR _or .M)IRMA) Statements,.Mgorithms and all other
measurement:command relationships (not necessarily involved in Health \lanagementl _n
.M-tificia[ Neural Network (,&N%) Prediction This gives additional validity that all [ntersvstem
Information Relationships have been included in the ISIRL and provides a significantly added
level of Predicted Fault Detection (Trending) capability
The result of this Statement/,adgorithm development is Documented in the Final [SIRL.
along with the defined Software Logic implementing the automated Decisions and Choices being
developed bv the Detail Software Design Personnel The manual Procedure Decisions and
Choices made must be identified as such in the Final ISIRL and will be included in
Test, Verification and Operational Procedures
The System Engineer must insure that testing and verification of all Statements_.Mgorithms
is included in the VRSD The validation of all Software Logic implementing .Mgorithms must be
included in Software Requirements Documentation
These implemented Health Management Processes will be subject to reviex,, and
Baselining at the CDR and comprise the output of the Detail Design Phase of Health
\lana_ement
29
IV.l.5 FAB AND TEST PHASE
This Health Management Phase encompasses Project Development Phase D. and involves
relatively little Health Management Development work However. the System Engineer must
monitor all the Hard_are build and assemblv to insure that Health Management Design is included
as planned and implemented in the documentation Software Development is also monitored to
insure inclusion of all Soft,,_are Logic related to Health Management Processes /br Fault
Detection. Prevention. Isolation. and Recovery The System Engineer participates in Test
Operations to the extent of insuring that all Paths/Statements and Algorithms which are included
in the ISIRL are verified to be correct and operational ,_1 HM Test Requirements must be
accomplished, including off-nominal testing to ,,'eri_' the statements and algorithms in the ISIRL
Mission Simulation Tests should include representative Health Management Decisions and
Choices. both by Software Logic (On-Board and Ground) and by manual procedure accomplished
bv on-board crew and by ground operations
The output of this Health Management Phase is an Integrated Health Management
Operational System. verified and ready to support Mission Operations.
IV.I.6 OPEIL-_TIONS PHASE
(Project Development Phase E) This Health Management Phase requires the support to
Mission Operations by the System Engineer in/at the Support Center The ISIRL is the
Handbook tbr providing this support since it includes all potential Functional Failure Detections.
Preventions. Isolations. and Recoveries The System Engineer should be ready to support an,,
Sub-Svste_System Designer in the role as Operations monitor providing technical
recommendations in any off-nominal circumstance. The System Engineer should record all
evidence of the role that Health Management Statements/Algorithms played in the operational
t]ow of the Mission This will provide valuable "Lesson Learned" information and enable future
Health Management implementation to be more overall effective
V.0 METItODOLOGY
V.I DECISION MAKING PROCESS
Reference Figure IV-4. HEALTH M,&NAGEMENT IMPLEMENTATION
LEVEL DECISION
There are three 3) Levels of FL\l Implementation These are
1) Level l--Aural Definition of Intersystem Relationships (.ZDIR)
2) Level 2--Aural Definition of [ntersystem Relationships with Modeling Assistance
(,M)ItL\IA)
3) Level 3--Aural Definition With ,&\_ (A.,-tificial Neural Network) Modeling_ .3d_),(\l)
Those results obtained in Level 1 (ADIR) are absolutely necessaD' in order to begin, or
progress, to Level 2 (.M3ItLMA) and/or Level 3 (AD:-LM) How:ever. it is not necessa_' to
perform Standard Modeling (,M)I_ILVIA) to progress to the implementation of Level 3 (AD.AM)
Level l (ADIR) Aural (Gleaning by Personal Communication) Definition is the gathering
and Documenting of all applicable (from FF-DAREL) Intersvstem Relationships, expressed in
terms of Parameters (Identified as a Measurement or a Command) (SEE Process V 4. ISIRL
PROCESS) The warking Document required for implementing this Level is the BASIC [SIRL
These Parameters are derived by conducting workshops with Detail Designers expressly for the
purpose of Identif3'ing Related Measurements and Commands which are Associated v, ith
Functional Failures identified in the FF-DAREL, and stating these Relationships mathematically
Level 2 tADItLMA) is the process of utilizing the lntersystem Relationships identified in
&DIR. and all other measurements and commands-which have not been shown to be related to
Functional Failures in the FF-DAREL, but mav have other internal relationships-in Standard
Modetino_ Prediction exercises. The primary purpose of this effort is to uncover an,,
measurement command relationship not identified in the Level 1 Aural Definition Process. and to
verifi,,/validate the mathematically expressed relationships
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Le,,el 3 IAD._\I) Implementation is the Process of. again, utilizing the Intersvstem
Relationships Identified in ADIR (and ADIfLMA. if implemented) in establishing Neural Patterns
of Functional Faults Fault diagnosis using Neural Networks has the same structure as Model-
Based methods--but the difference is in the diagnosis technique The theory, and practical
application of Artificial Neural Networks (ANN's) is relatively new but is expanding at a very high
rate Fault Diagnosis is one of the most promising applications, and, overcomes some of the
shortcomings of Model-Based techniques The approach requires relatively exact knov, led_-e of
the parameters in the Model and calculations can very easily become excessively time-consuminu
(Ref No cL "Real Time Fault Monitoring of Industrial Processes"--Chapter 5-- (Microprocessor-
Based and [ntelligem System Engineering) Vol. 12-- By A D Pouliezos and G S Stavrakakis--
Kluv,er Academic Publishers. 1994). These Characteristics must be considered in decidin_ to
implement Level 3 (AD._A), Health Management
The I_! Level Decision Making Process should consider the above Description and
Definitions--however--rarely does this type information, alone, provide the answer The other
major factors include: Cost, Schedule, Complexity, and Desired Probability of Mission Success
(PMS) The Project Engineer must evaluate ALL considerations and factors and make the
Decision
'_tr 2 HEALTH MANAGEMENT MEASUREMENT PROGRAM
(HM-MP) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
GENER.M_. A sample Form of the HM-MP is shown in Figure V-1, I-LM-MP FOR_MAT
The I-LM-MP has basically the same format and information as the "IP&CL".
but it is developed relatively informally, in an earlier time frame, and supports other HXl
Processes
Reference Figure 28, MSFC-HDBK-1912A, Vol. 1, Page 85,- The
"Preliminary' IP&CL" identified in this Process Flow can possibly be the "HM-MP" described in
;2
this HNIProcess--ho_ever.additionalsupportingintbrmationisrequiredtbr HXl purposestSee
FigureV-2. _\I-MP ProcessFlo,,,_)
ReferenceMSFC-STD-1924(IP&CL)
It is not clear as to who is the approvalauthority tbr includingany given
measurementin the design,but it is assumedthat the Detail Designercan identifythe need.v_ill
includeit in thedesignandjustify' it's needin theSRR.PDR.andCDR. or until Baseliningot'the
HM-MP at CDR Neither is it clear what criteria is used for selectin_measurementsand
commands HealthManagementrequirementsandinterestscan.andshould,impactthis selection
process
TheI-KM-MPdevelopmentis a Proactive Process (System Engineer-Lead. but
Detail Designer is a major contributor) It is not a CCB controlled Document but one that may
be reviewed as part of SRR, PDR, and CDR as supporting information It is the responsibility of
the System Engineer who has responsibility for Health Management to maintain and assure its
accuracy
SPECIFIC In developing the I-LM-MP, the following questions must be asked and the
ansv,ers appropriately documented as part of this Working Document (I-_I-MP)
1) Why is the Measurement/Command required"
- Is it merely to determine proper operation of a systernJsub-system'.)
- Is it to provide scientific information",
There is discrete intbrmation and analog value data-are manual, automatic, or no real time
decisions required to be made from this measurement ..)Is it just for Post-Flight data reduction
2) What is the consequence of the measurement'command failing7 _
3 ) Is there another measurement (or measurements) which can yield the same, or nearly
the same, intbrmation '_
- Can the alternate measurement(s) calibration curve (polynomial) be stated as an
Algorithm '_
4) What other measurements are related in any way (Do they va_ in any predictable way
_hen the primal' parameter varies '_) (How can this relation be stated _ -In an
,Mgorithm _ -Either mathematically, or as F(x)=F(y) _ Z, where Z is not kno_ n. except
as Z = (M-L) (L approaches M)
5) Who is the Measurement Requestor_
6)
7)
,4. Software Parameter List must be generated (measurement or command)--This is a
computer generated parameter/measurement/command ol- a statement/algorithm
expressed in message structure form.
The standard IP&CL measurement/command list includes the following
intbrmation which is also required in the HM "HM-MP"
- Measurement/Command Name and Number
- Sample Rate Required (Function of Frequency Response)
- Accuracy - Stated in Terms (- or -) % of Full Scale
- Range (in Engineering Units)
- Communication Path and Data Address
- Command Verifier (Measurement)
34
H M- M P
; i
or ,_R ix, Pt • "-" _- I_F lF.l ')
,'ommand No qX)XL\I.\ND N ',_\{E 7" ""
:
U "('LnR. _.C'_
('_)X L\ I.\NT) BI I
'! )NFT_ ;L'R _. H_ *N
1-1l 12-51 52 53 - _J, 55-%, 57 - "1 --_- _
_:0e,=
-_
E
<
2:
=g
- -- " 2 z
_" _e ... z 7_•Z
f. --_
<=L,
7
2
2:
7
: r.. "i' _._
EX.L\IPLES
HM-MP
D_S OR
Co.x EMAN'D
\ERIHER
kDDRESS
NEED
(USE)
CR.ITIC.\LITY REL.\ FED
ME _,S_,"RE x._ N-IS
X[E.iSL'REX LEN-I
REUt "ES [_ ,R
8a.- 103 104- 173 I'_4- 193 194- 213 210- 2;5
z
4
5
73
z
z =
=
2_
--7,
Xz2 <
" ":- Z ""
m
.a,a_ {
5--¢g-?
21J, 215
2
Z
z
..a.
>, Z
/ Z=:___
_Fgggg
EX.LXIPLES
FIGURE V-l HE.kLTH NL&NAGEMENT .MEASL'RF.MENT PROGRAA, I FOR.\IAT
35
V
[ - I
,<2:,1 _<:?dE',q ", i II
_Ji._ :Ki.IME>,T_ _ DEVEL©PHM&Ip
SE SE I
R_ESPO %SIBILI'_"
SE _YST!LM k %, ;i %k_.k
DDE bET KIL _ k'_[ "% } \ ;i',_} k
_1 H",I-M P _ i_,._] M:kINT kin
v v [ HM-MP
FIGURE V-2 HM-MP PROCESS FLOW
V.3 FF-DAREL DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
GENERAL : The FF-DAREL is the FMEA for HM
The purpose of the FF-DAREL is to list all possible hardware Functional
Failures It is developed by Systems Engineering and Detailed Designers It
identifies Hardware and Software interrelationships which allow tracing failure
propagation through all hardware levels. It is a Process which follov,s the
Standard FM_EA activities outlined in NI-IB 5300.4 (1D-2) and summarized in
the "¥' paragraph below
The FF-DAREL must be developed during the HM Prelimina_' and Detail
Design Phases, as opposed to the FMEA/CIL activity which is developed to
the "as-built" configuration and takes place just prior to, and just subsequent to
the CDR (RefNHB 5300 4)
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FMEA's goal is to identify failure modes/effects and to pertbrm correctixe
action by implementing design, or by procedure change FF-D.AREL identifies
Functional Failure Modes and Effects and has the goal of recognizing.
isolating, preventing or recovering from the failures by planned action during
the mission
FF-D,,MREL addresses Functional Failures without regard to criticalit\ Those
Functional Failures v_hich are later determined to be Criticality 1 or I R b\
FMEA will be addressed only to the scope of HM in this Process-but F\IEA
Processes/Corrective Action may take precedence and override, or alter, the
I-_ approach
I-_1 identified Functional Faults cannot (alone) cause Design Changes But.
since FF-DAREL evolves through Preliminary. and Detail Design. changes can
o cur bv the Detail Designer without CCB action prior to CDR
If there are definitely Criticality 1 and 1R Failures identified, the Sxstem
Engineer, responsible for I--_, will insure that the S&MA and Project Manager
are aware of the Failure possibility and that they are addressing it through the
normal FMF.AJClL Process.
The System Engineer and Detail Designers, during the development of the FF-
DAREL, will not assume that the crew will perform (or respond) to any Failure
Effect obsem'ed, nor will they take any Corrective Action unless the Time
Criticality is such that it is absolutely certain that Corrective Action can
successfully take place
S ructural Failures, and Passive Components. such as TPS, are not to be
considered in the FF-DAREL development. However, Pressure Vessels are to
be included, but only to the extent of instrumentation and signal conditionin_
Seals. barriers, hoses, tanks, fines, ducts, are not to be considered in the FF-
DAREL
A Table. showing Redundant. or Back-up Hardware, will be developed
Details of how to switch in. or place it in operation (such as a Software
command) must be included in the FF-DAR.EL and the command, if utilized.
will be included in the FLM-MP
: "Success Paths" (Redundant Paths) will be listed and "Like" or "Unlike"
Hardware located in the Paths being identified
: Definition--"Like" Redundancy = Identical Hardware Items and "Unlike"
Redundancy = Non Identical Hardware performing the same function
Manually emplaced LRU's need only to be listed, No planned utilization is
addressed in this FLM Concept Assume that they will operate properly if
placed in the System.
See Figure V-3, TYPIC.M. FUNCTIONAL FAILURES (Key
Words)
: Typical causes are listed in Figure V-4, TYPICAL
FL,'NCTIONAL FA.LLURE CAUSES (Key Words)
Propagation of Failures from one Sub-system to another must
be analyzed with both Designers (or both sub-system boxes) if
the same Designer is responsible for both boxes.
: Time to criticality will be addressed on each Functional
Failure
_8
TYPICAL FUNCTIONAL FAILURES
ErraticOperation
Failsto RemainOpervClosed
FailsMid-Travel
Fails ,o OpervCIose
Fails Out of Tolerance
Inadvertent Operation
Intermittent Operation
Internal/External Leakage
Physical Binding/Jamming
Restricted Flow
Structural Failure (Rupture)
Premature Operation
Delayed Operation
Erroneous Output
Partial Output
Open (Electrical)
Leakage (Electrical)
Loss of Output
Fails to Switch
Shorted
Fails to Start Stop
FIGURE V-3. TYPICAL FUNCTIONAL FAILURES
TYPICAL FUNCTIONAL FAILURE CAUSES
Acoustics
Contamination
Erroneous Input
Mechanical Shock
Overload
Vacuum
Ionizing Radiation
Temperature
Partial Input
Thermal Shock
Acceleration
Pressure (Higlv'L ow)
Loss of Input
Vibration
Electromagnetic Fields
Piece-Part
Structural Failure
Chemical Reaction
FIGURE V-4. TYPICAL FUNCTIONAL FAILURE CAUSES
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SPECIF[C
2)
3)
4)
5)
The Process starts by defining the sub-systerrvsystem and it's performance
requirements
Block Diagrams are developed which represent simplified models of the sub-
svste_ system
L'tilize the M\'ALYSIS WORKSHEET (See Figure V-5. FF-DAREL
_,VORKSHEET) Complete this Worksheet for eve W identified Functional Failure
Every element (Usually a Box) in the System being analyzed must be addressed
Identify the Box by nomenclature and by Ref. Des Number
"Like" and "Unlike" Redundancy hardware and paths must all be identified and
listed in the FF-DAREL
6) The "Effects" or result of the Functional Failure are documented on the Worksheet
and all measurements which reveal those effects are identified and listed
-,) The t;_llowing Information is required for each Functional Failure identified
-Mode (Time) = Premature Operation
= Failure to operate at required time
= Failure to cease operation at required time
= Failure during operation
-Cause = ldenti_ the cause
-Effect = List all effects and measurements which indicate the effects
-Related Measurements = List any "related" measurements which will definitely
give an indication, but "maw or "may not" be prime information sources for revealing the Failure
State whether these measurements are a reliable source or a questionable informational back-up
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source of data which could be used to either "question" the validitv of the Prime measurement or
to "validate" the Failure Effect
-Time To Effect = Indicate the Shortest time betbre effects ,,_,ill be indicated
(i e Immediately, later in mission, etc )
-Corrective Action = Identif)/' Actions (automatic and manual) which be taken
to circumvent t'ailure
-Time tbr Corrective Action = Indicate the maximum time to perform
Corrective Action b_.tbre opportunity is lost
The FF-DAREL consists of the Worksheets as described above and Tables which include
supporting intbrmation They are critical to development of the ISIRL, the KEY I-LM Document
FUNCTIONAL FAILURE - DEFINITION AND RESULTING EFFECTS LISTING
FF-DAREL )
WORKSHEET
SHEET 1
SYSTEM
SUBSYSTEM/ASSY
COMPONENT EQUIP
DRAWING SCHEMATIC
REF DES
MISSION PHASE PRE-LAUNCH FF NO
ASCENT
DEPLOYMENT DATE
OPERATIONS
CONTINGENCYfRETL'RN
PAGE
FF
NO
 NCTI0 
DESCRIPTION
FAILURE CAUSE
DEFINITION
RESULTING
EFFECTS
TIME TO
EFFECT
TIME FOR
CORR
ACTION
FIGURE V-5 FF-DAREL WORKSHEET (PAGE 1 OF 2)
(FF-DAREL)
WORKSHEET
SHEET2
FFNO:
DATE:
PAGE
S/W
ACTION
REQUIRED
CORRECTIVE
ACTION PLANNED
REDUNDANT/BU
HARDWARE
INDICATION
MEASUREMENTS
SUMMARY-(SIGNIFICANT FAILURE INTO):
CONCLUSION:
FIGURE V-5 FF-DAREL WORKSHEET (PAGE 2 OF 2)
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V.4 INTER-SYSTEM INFOILMATION RELATIONSHIP LISTING (ISIRL)
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
The purpose of this Process is to document all Functional Failure Indications (Detection)_
Prevention. Prediction, [so[anon Measures. and Recovery Actions. The IS[RL is the KEY
Workin,2 Document a Manual consisting of all ISIRL Sheets) for I-_1 support during the
Fabrication:Test Phase and the Operations/Mission Phase
It is developed in conjunction with the two other l-Dr! Working Documents [The Health
Management-Measurement Program (I-LM-MP), and the Functional Failure-Definition and
Resulting Effects Listing (FF-DAREL)] Development of this Manual begins in the "Conceptual
Design Phase" t Reference Figure III-l) with the Preliminary Version being an output of the
"Preliminary' Design Phase" The Final ISIRL is the Key output of the "Detail Design Phase"
The ISIRL Document (See Figure V-6, Typical ISIRL Format) lists all Statements and
,_gorithms associated with each Functional Failure (Fault) which was identified in the FF-
DAREL The Statements and Algorithms and other identifying data define the "Fingerprint" of
the Functional Failure and define the planned method of accommodating the failure. The ISIRL
Document implements and documents all data gathered regarding each Functional Failure
i Detection. Prevention, Prediction, Isolation and Recovery,) and the indications, inter-
relationships, and actions to be taken derived from the selected Level of FLM Implementation
t See Section V 1) Implementation, as outlined in this ISIRL, maybe by (I) SoRware Logic. or.
by 12) Manual Procedure
The [S[RL Manual consists of sheets for each Functional Failure and defines, at least, the
follo_ing information:
-- Functional Failure No (from FF-DAREL)
-- Functional Failure Definition (Narrative)
-- Functional Failure Detection (Indications)
(Measurements and Values)
-- Preventive Measures Planned
.,t._
-- Planned Rccover_ Actions (Narrative)
(S.&V Logic Routine Description--and/or Manual Procedure Steps)
Primary.' and Redundant circuitry', paths and functional elements (boxes) are identified and
the measurement(s) and values will be identified to insure that (I) the Sensor,'Acquisition system
is not at fault, and (2) that the planned action is taken within the "Time t'or Corrective Action" and
that the present configuration, and anv Commands given are indicated by planned, identified
measurements x_ith predicted values
Again, this Manual consists of all the information required to assist Test and Operations
Control personnel in the real-time on-line activities Software Routines (operating by automatic
sequencing, behind the scene, and as part of the normal time-line sequence) are also to be
included if they are required to accommodate (Detect. Prevent. Predict, Isolate and Recovert the
Functional Failure
-_5
FIGUREV-6
ISIRL
WORKSHEET
FUNCTIONAL FAILURE NO (FROM FF-DAREL)
FUNCTIONAL FAILLRE DEFINITION (NARtL_.TIVE)
Basic Sheet
Contmuauon Sheet
Sheet No
FL,'NCTIONAL FAILURE DETECTION (INDICATIONS)
MEALUREMENTS tPRIME) VALUES (LIMITS/DELTA)
MEASUREMENTS IALTERNATE) VALUES (LIMITS/DELTA)--RISK
PREVENTIVE MEASURES PLANNED (STEPS)
ISOLATION MEASURES TO BE TAKEN (STEPS)
PLAN,_ED RECOVERY ACTIONS (NARRATIVE)
S/W ROUTINES (NAME) PURPOSE (SEE NOTE 1)
MANUAL PROCEDUq_ES (SEE NOTE 1)
STEP 1
"3
3
NOTE t THESE ACTIONS ARE PREFERRED TO BE STATED BY ALGORITHMS OR
STATEMENTS x,_MICH ARE PRE-DEVELOPED AND ONLY REQUIRE INITIATION--BL-I- MAY
BE MANUAL STEPS
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V.5 HM REQUIREMENTS GENER-kTION
INTRODUCTION
The task of insuring the design of I-_1 into a system, is described here in is a tour step process
which parallels and sometimes is interleaved with the normal system engineering process This
process assumes that the functional analysis has been completed and that a concept has been
selected The first step of the process is to decompose and allocate system requirements to the
appropriate subsystem The second step is to synthesize the system The third step is to evaluate
and make a decision based on the alternatives The final and fourth step is to describe the system
elements in the form of specifications and plans Figure V-7 is a flow chart which depict the
engineering Process involving Health Management
DECOMPOSE CONCEPT (FUNCTIONAL ALLOCATION)
Decompose the system into configuration items until a level is reached at which a specific
hardware item or software routine can fulfill the intended I-LMperformance requirements Some
straight forward decomposition of the system can be made, but the procedure may involve the use
of supporting analyses and simulations to allocate system level requirements The subject of
supporting analyses will be discussed later But at this point, FE_I requirements, if unknov, n.
should be assumed using one's engineering experience. A time line analysis of the system v, ill
provide insight into the selection or derivation of some I-LM requirements Hence, a time line
analysis should be performed on the decomposed concept.
The time line analyses is used to determine timing requirements for time critical functions with
associated tolerances, determine trade-off process between man and machine, identify ,,,,hat
processes should be autonomous, develop trade studies in areas other than time considerations
such as whether the spacecraft navigation should be located on the ground or onboard, and
estimate I_I requirements The time line analysis is used to derive lower level I-LM subsystem
requirements for each configuration component. I--LMrequirements should be documented so
that each I-_1 requirement is identified, its source, and show the allocation to the next lov_er level
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S'_'.'NTHESIZE THE SYSTEM
The purpose at this point of the process is to strike a balance among functional performance
requirements, system constraints, and mission success criteria (expressed mathematically as the
Probability of Missi,_n Success [P(*iS)]) in determining the appropriate I-LM design concepts
Synthesis. or conceptual design, is the activity which assures that system influences, along x_,ith
FL\I requirements, are given the proper consideration in arriving at a design concepts
Engineering creativity and technology are brought to bear in the creation of a system or design
concept which best meets the stated system FLM requirements Synthesis considers the results of
various technical and design studies FLM. being an integral part of system engineering, has input
into the design process
The means by which the system is synthesized can be either be physical or mathematical The
synthesizing process requires that engineering organize, evaluate, and examine the validity of the
thought processes The use of the process permits an optimization of H3M hardware and software
parameters, allows performance predictions of subsystems to be made, and permits operational
I-LM sequences to be derived.
SCFEENL_.TIC PLOCK DIAGRAMS
A schematic block diagram (SBD) is one of the primary tools for the system synthesis by
ser_ing as the basis for models of the system. They are developed, with I-LM in mind. at
successively lower levels as analysis proceeds to define lower level functions within higher level
requirements The SBD shows selected functions and data interfaces within the system The SBD
is used to develop Interface Control Documents (ICD), provide all overall understanding of
system operations and to provide a basis for the integration of the HM function A key goal of
H_I is to influence the design of modular units which implement a single independent function.
performs a single logical task, has a single entry and e.,dt point, and is separately testable
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PHYSIC,&L MODELING
Physical models can be either full size. scale, hardware, or analog representations of the
system Where human interaction is involved in tBI, such as manned vehicles or control
consoles, the models are frequently built full size. tBI engineering use them to veri_' controls,
and response times as _,ell as to establish maintainability characteristics and ensure maximum
efficiency of operation Full scale models are also used by designers to provide a three
dimensional represeatation of complex structures to facilitate design of features such as cable
harness routing, box placement, and access opening locations As an example t-B,I would have
input to box placement If the box is placed in an hostile environment, then I-B,I would derive
more stringent kLM requirements for the box On the other hand, t-LM could influence the
placement of the box in a favorable environment Breadboards or brassboards are another use of
physical modeling where the model us used to provide proof of t-LM functional operation or to
establish critical performance characteristics.
MATHEMATICAL MODELING
A mathematical model is an abstract representation (without regard to ph,,sical
implementation) of a system. A model will provides a means of developing quantitative HS, I
performance requirements from which candidate designs can be developed There are basically
two types of mathematical models, static and dynamic.
Static I-_l model are those that depict conditions of state, such as the loading of a mechanical
structure If the equilibrium condition is changed by altering the loading conditions, ne,,,_ values
tbr the load paths may be obtained analytically, but the model does not indicate the manner in
,xhich the load paths achieved their new state. Should it be desired to optimize the load paths
according to the capability of structural members, a numerical solution would be required
Dynamic I-LM models are used to depict conditions that va_ with time But the systems
engineer with I-LM in mind need to depict the random occurrence of faults of a svstems that _a_
discretely or continuously with respect to time and space Simple dynamic models can be solved
analytically but as the system increases in complexity numerical methods are necessaB' Because
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of theavailabilityof inexpensivecomputerhardware,HM parametersimulationis lesscostlythan
buildingandtestinganactualsystem
EVM..UATION A_N_DECISION
It shouldbestatedthatthe intentis not to constrain the system engineer but to provide a basis
for his though process Engineering innovation is encouraged Deviation, as required, from the
process is the engineer's prerogative
DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM ELEMENT
At this point in the process, engineering knows how FLM is to be implemented at the system
level Such factors as system interfaces, interoperability, communications function, personnel
functions, etc are known. Special purpose t-LM equipment should be defined and described how
the,,' fit into the 'as built" configuration. For those cases where HM functions are an innate part
of the system, these functions should be described and shown how they fit into the overall svstem
I-LM data flow must be defined and shown how HM data permeates through the system The
following is a list of candidate items which should be included in the system element description
1) Health Management Data Flow indicating what decisions are needed at distinct times and
locations in the overall vehicle infrastructure, associated information needs, and how the
information is collected, stored, and distributed. This plan is prelude to the Instrumentation
Program & Command List (IP&CL).
2) Overall Verification and Validation should be formulated to veri_ that the design
provisions for active fault accommodation are effective in the operational environment Planning
tbr a software, and later, a full hardware/software simulation of the Health Management System is
necessary to support verification This plan is the prelude to the Verification Plan
31 Decision on the degree for human interaction in the FLM decision making process
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4) Sot:txvaredrivers,languagepreferences,datastorage,throughput,protocol,and similar
informationimpactingthe overall systemsoftwareplanneedsto be input to the systemdesign
level
5) Passivefauh tolerancerequirements,wherespecialhardwaredesignfeaturesare to be
used to achievepassivefault tolerance,are identified TheseHM requirementsneedto be
integratedinto thetotal systemleveldesignprocess
6) Requirementsthat mustbe incorporatedinto thesimulationtestbedto supporttheHXI
designprocess
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,MPPENDIX III 1
STATE-OF-THE-ART HEALTH MONITORING TECHNIQUES
ON BOARD NAV,td_ VESSELS
Approach
A review of the document revealed that their approach was health or condition monitoring
and reporting of a t'ault when it occurred. The basic philosophy was to approach the technique
step-wise Several types of analytical techniques were used to monitor the naval diesel engine
The approach was to parallel the techniques used by the engine room personnel such as sight.
sound, smell, and touch (vibration. temperature) Some of the reasons for this approach _,ere
1 The experienced operator is able to "measure' simultaneously a number of relevant signals
(smell. noise, vibration, temperature, smoke) in a three dimensional continuous field
2 In many cases the sensitivity of the "measurement' may be high
3 The experienced operator evaluates, trends and combines the measured signals and. as a
result, gives, in many cases, a correct diagnosis."
Success
The study showed a great deal of success A great deal of information can be obtained from
health or condition monitoring. The Royal Netherlands Navy used the concept to augment their
maintenance of shipboard machinery. One of the systems presented in the document _as the
Intelligent Control and Monitoring System (ICMOS)
The main functions of the ICMOS are performance monitoring, trend prediction, operational
advice, and diagnosis The system was capable of making performance checks tbr different
loading and ambient conditions Trending data and faults could be shown together x_ith a
prediction of future behavior of the monitored system Operational advise would be provided
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which,upontheoccurrenceof a fault, would indicatethetime to criticality andindicatehow to
operatewithout causingdamage In thecaseof a deviationbetweenactualhealthybehavioris
detected,a diagnosiswould be performed The diagnosiswould indicatethe causeof the
malfunctionandseverityalongwitha confidencefactor
TheICMOSis basedona modelof theenginerealizedin software Duringoperations,rax_
data from the sensorswouldbe collected Raw datawould thenbe comparedto the expected
datafrom themodelwhilesimulatingtheactualoperatingconditionsof theengine After theraw
dataandmodeldatahasbeencompared,theresultantdifferencedataispresentedto theoperator
via theoperatorinterface
The interface provides the means by u'hich the operator interacts with the system Color
displays provide the user with the capability to interrogate the system graphically and obtain
information regarding the status of the system, components, and sensors The interlace is
organized in a hierarchical organization of the engine and its components At the top level there is
a schematic representation of the engine in terms of its subsystems Choosing any of the
subsystems will result in the display of the schematic representation of the components and their
connectivity together with the location of the sensors and their type The color of the sensors.
components and subsystems will change whenever there is a significant deviation from normal In
the event of a fault, the fault is presented to the operator along with the level of confidence The
operator has the option of accepting, deferring or rejecting the hypothesis The operator can
inspect and change the value of the sensor readings and have ICMOS reassess the diagnostic
Problems
There seemed to be two basic problems The first is how to detect a pending fault _,here the
fault does not manifest itself until damage has occurred The second is how to use this health or
condition data once it has been collected. If the data is presented to the operator, he would soon
be deluged with information Hence, there must be a means by which the information is reduced
to a point where it is useful to the human mind
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Wearon rotationalmachineryis a primeexamplewherea fault hasnot manifesteditself until
damagehasalreadybeendone Typicall.v, wear is detected by vibration analysis However. the
vibration fault signature does not appear until wear is sufficient enough to produce a measurab[e
vibration This points to the need tbr more instrumentation such as a temperature sensor
Computer assistance is the obvious answer to the problem of the deluge of information
presented to the operator Software is available or can be developed v_hich would pertbrm the
task of data reduction or integration Mathematical models and heuristic knov, ledge can be
realized in the software However, there are a class of problems that cannot be sol_ed
mathematically or by rule-based reasoning It is problems like this that neural networks offer
significant promise
It was stated that the data acquisition system needed a means by which to self check Sexeral
instances were mentioned where a bad sensor would lead to a false alarm This resulted in loss
time. Another case that should be mentioned is overrating. Having tight specifications can result
in excessive down time Designing to more tolerant specifications could be a tool by u_hich H.XI
can increase reliability, decrease cost, and increase operational life
Assessment
The document presented a program which yielded the very valuable first step lessons as to the
approach Prognostic research in the areas of trending and artificial intelligence is needed as the
science of HM progresses There are cases where whole subsystems can be monitored by
monitoring the behavior rather than monitoring the internal components The prime case is the
diesel engine In other cases such as bearings or fuel injectors, these components need to be
monitored directly These special components seem to be ones which require a higher level of
maintenance The area of the implementation has a foundation but the limitations are a function
of the imagination of Systems Engineering
Bearings are a case where condition or health monitoring will yield no fault indicating data
until damage has occurred. Hence, heuristic methods would be an answer in that the expected life
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of thebearingcould be predicted This means that perfectly good bearing might be replaced But
in either case, monitoring the health and well being of the bearing do not take into account such
things as malalignment which would contribute to shorter life of the bearing
_._hen monitoring whole subsystems, such as the diesel engine, the condition or health of the
subsystem can be closely monitored Monitoring the intake air flow' rate would indicate when
maintenance should t_e performed such as the air filter needs to be cleaned or replace Blo_-bv
pressure monitoring can indicate piston ring u,'ear Pattern recognition of acoustical sound x_ould
detect faulty valves or blown head gasket
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APPENDIX III2
NEUtLa.L NETWORK .APPROACH TO SPACE SHUTTLE
MAIN ENGINE HEALTH MONITORING
Approach
The approach _sas to select data from a test where a know anomaly did occur Po_,,er spectra
from a few hundred seconds of actual test data. where anomalies were known to occur, from
NASA tests c)01-36a and 904-044 were used to test the neural network Test 901-364 contained
an anomaly in the low-frequency temperature and pressure data and high-frequency' strain gauge
data in 904-044 Since data was presented to the neural network in discrete samples over a
period of time called FFT window, the neural network must be able to identify' the anomaly during
the last FFT window prior to the emergency' shut-down In other words, the neural network must
be able to identi_' an anomaly' in sufficient time so that fault tolerant action or corrective action
can be taken The study was to investigate the capability of a neural network to identify an
anomaly during the FFT window where the anomaly did occur
Success
The investigation was a success as it indicates and demonstrates that neural networks can
recognize anomalies during the sampling period of a FFT window Further. the test sho_ss that
neural networks can be trained with fault free operational data. After training, the netxsork can
identify' the deviation from normal operation Given that the operational data collected by the
sensors ,,sill change when a control action is implemented, it is possible for the network to tolerate
the change in operational data along with the inherent background noise If this line of progress.
in this application science is continued, neural netvvorks can be trained with normal operational
data This type of data is much easier and cheaper to collect Having the sufficient training data
available is one of the prerequisites for the effective application of neural networks to Health
Xlanagement
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Problems
Normal operational data was used to train the networks Failure data to train the neural
networks is not readily available and hence was not used to train the network Several cases of
failure data from the same type sensor is needed to train the network if the network is to be able
to recognize the failure Because normal operational data was used to train the net_ork, the
network could only predict or identi_ an anomaly when there was a deviation from the expected
normal Hence, the network does not identify.' an anomaly, it identifies an unknown
Assessment
Much _ork is need before neural networks can be used effectively Much study on the subject of
neural networks is needed but the use of neural network shows a great deal of promise Even
though there is a great deal of evidence which indicates that neural networks is the answer, the
science of the application of neural networks in real systems is not mature In order to mature the
science, neural networks should be used in cases where the benefits is realizable and beneficial
As research continues and lessons learned are generated, the application of neural netx_orks _vill
mature
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APPENDIX III 3
HEM.TH MONITORING SYSTEM FOR THE SSNflE:
H._RDWARE .ARCHITECTURE STUDY
Approach
The major objective of the program, of which this paper was written. ,,as to assess and
evaluate candidate approaches for detecting SSNflE failures before the red-line cutoff" The
approach included a study of fault detection algorithms, and an assessment of existing and near
term sensor technologies The fault detection approach, developed by UTRC, used algorithms
and a system hierarchy, which exploited the interrelated characteristics of the SSME components
and parameter measurements
The report is an architectural study for a SSME Health Monitoring System, with one of the
requirements being that the design could be flown on the launch vehicle Hov_ever, the initial
study would be done on the SSME test stand It was accepted as a given that the test site system
would not be flight worthy but would have more processing power since weight would not be a
problem. In addition, the test sight would provide a test bed to validate and test the algorithms
Problems
Since the program was a study, there were no real problems identified due to the application
However; there seemed to be three areas of concern, algorithms, throughput, and weight
A set of three algorithmic approaches were developed and implemented to detect faults.
obser,,ing gradual long term trends, detecting quick and high amplitude excursions, and obserxin-
oscillatory or non-steady state behavior A sensor fusion technique was developed to detect
failures which manifest themselves as gradual trends in performance parameter measurements and
to distinguish this deviation from trends associated with normal engine operation Autoregressixe
moving average models, based on time series analysis, were developed to detect fast excursions in
engine parameters and also changes of engine parameters due to the transition of the engine from
a stationary.' to a non-stationary, condition. The Recursive Structural Identification (RESID)
6O
algorithm was used to develop a regressive model between the SSME propellant flows and the
thrust chamber pressure during open-loop start and shut-down
In any real time system, throughput is always critical Based on the throughput analysis, over
200 MIPS are required The analysis also provides some insight into the complexity of the
hardware On the basis of throughput, there is expected to be no difference between the flight
tLMS and the ground system In realitv it is expected that the flight hardware would have less
processing power because of weight restrictions
Assessment
As stated in the conclusion, a design methodology was demonstrated which would provide for
the transition of a Health Management system from the test stand to the flight vehicle Since the
ground based I-LMS system does use existing instrumentation, it is believed that the I-LMS system
can be designed, developed, and fielded within five years.
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APPENDLX IV
DEFINITIONS
1. Ah_,orithm
A rule stated as a procedure tbr solving a problem In the case of Health Management.
it detects and isolates and recovers from functional problems, performs trend analysis and cross
checks data Four Types Hard Limit
Relational Limit
Time Modified Limit
Logical Limit
2. Statement
Facts on a given condition which declare relationships to one or more other conditions
Used to define Intersvstem Relationships which may, or may not. be suitable to be defined in an
equation
3. Software Logic
Coded information (._gorithms or Statements) used by a computer to
isolate, and/or recover from functional problems
detect, prevent,
4. LRt._..__'
Line Replaceable Unit (.Am available Spare)
5. Redundant/Backup
A secondary Functional Element(s) (hardware or path) which performs the same
as the primaD' element Maybe "like" or "unlike" Measurements with definable,
intbrmation are a form of redundancy and make the system fault tolerant
purpose
related
6. Functional Failure/Fault
.Am unacceptable operation of an "active" Functional Element (a component or a group of
components) which has been chosen to perform a specific purpose, or job, and to operate within
defined parameter values and boundaries. "Functional Element" is usually depicted as a
"Functional Block" in a "Functional Block Diagram"
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7. FF-DAREL
{Functional Failure-Definition and Resulting Effects Listing) It identifies
Failures, Modes, Indicators and Effects
Functional
8. Failure Mode
Ways that a "Functional Element" can fail, ie "switch fails closed"
9. Failure Effect
The consequences that a Functional Failure can cause
10. Time To Effect-Criticality
The maximum time t¥om occurrence of a Functional Failure until effects occur (Effects
may. or may not, be reversible)
11. DIP
{Diagnostic Information Processing) Housekeeping and Control data generation.
information gleaning, and automated fault prediction, detection, prevention, and recovery Same
as Integrated Diagm,stic Concept)
12. lnteRrated Diagnostic Concept
Same as DIP
13. Information
Data communicated to a decision making process (human or machine) which
level of intelligence necessary to make those decisions
contains a
14. Probability of Mission Success
The mathematical prediction (basis) for meeting criteria judging a mission to be successful.
and given in the form of a ratio of successes to a total number of attempts
15. Aural Definition of lntersystem Relationships {ADIR}
Brute force, manual, driving out Intersystem Relationships by direct discussions bet,aeen
skilled systems designers/engineers The System Engineer, while participating in the discussions.
compiles these defimtion/relationships from vocal designer inputs
63
16. Aural Definition of lntersvstem Relationships Vfith Modeling Assistance (ADilLMA)
Defining of lntersystem Relationships (ADIR) supplemented by standard modeling
techniques
17. Aural Definition With ANN Modeling (ADAM)
Defining lntersvstem Relationships (ADIR) supplemented by' Artificial
Projections
Neural Networks
18. Availability
The operability' of a system as a function of time [A(t) is the probability that the system is
operational at the instant of time, t ]
19. Fault Containment/Fault Containment Re_ion
Preventing a Functional Failure in a Functional Element from causing a Functional Failure
in other Functional Elements
20. Health ManaRement
Those processes, techniques, and technologies used to define, design, analyze, build.
veri_, and operate a system from the viewpoint of preventing, or minimizing, the effects of failure
or degradation It supports all ground and flight elements during manufacturing, refurbishment,
integration and operation through combined use of hardware, software, and personnel
21. Proactive
A word formed by replacing the "Re" with "Pro" In Health Management, it means
"Acting in anticipation of future problems, needs, or- changes"
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